Managerial Economics Applications Strategies and Tactics 13th Edition by James R Mcguigan, R Charles Moyer, Frederick HdeB Harris – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 1285420926, 9781285420929
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ISBN 10: 1285420926
ISBN 13: 9781285420929
Author: James R Mcguigan, R Charles Moyer, Frederick HdeB Harris
Managerial Economics Applications Strategies and Tactics 13th Table of contents:
Part I. Introduction
Chapter 1. Introduction and Goals of the Firm
1-1. What Is Managerial Economics?
1-2. The Decision-Making Model
1-2a. The Responsibilities of Management
1-2b. Moral Hazard in Teams
1-3. The Role of Profits
1-3a. Risk-Bearing Theory of Profit
1-3b. Temporary Disequilibrium Theory of Profit
1-3c. Monopoly Theory of Profit
1-3d. Innovation Theory of Profit
1-3e. Managerial Efficiency Theory of Profit
1-4. Objective of the Firm
1-4a. The Shareholder Wealth-Maximization Model of the Firm
1-5. Separation of Ownership and Control: The Principal-Agent Problem
1-5a. Divergent Objectives and Agency Conflict
1-5b. Agency Problem
1-6. Implications of Shareholder Wealth Maximization
1-6a. Caveats to Maximizing Shareholder Value
1-6b. Residual Claimants
1-6c. Goals in the Public Sector and Not-for-Profit Enterprises
1-6d. Not-for-Profit Objectives
1-6e. The Efficiency Objective in Not-for-Profit Organizations
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Chapter 2. Fundamental Economic Concepts
2-1. Demand and Supply: A Review
2-1a. The Diamond-Water Paradox and the Marginal Revolution
2-1b. Marginal Utility and Incremental Cost Simultaneously Determine Equilibrium Market Price
2-1c. Individual and Market Demand Curves
2-1d. The Demand Function
2-1e. Import-Export Traded Goods
2-1f. Individual and Market Supply Curves
2-1g. Equilibrium Market Price of Gasoline
2-2. Marginal Analysis
2-2a. Total, Marginal, and Average Relationships
2-3. The Net Present Value Concept
2-3a. Determining the Net Present Value of an Investment
2-3b. Sources of Positive Net Present Value Projects
2-3c. Risk and the NPV Rule
2-4. Meaning and Measurement of Risk
2-4a. Probability Distributions
2-4b. Expected Values
2-4c. Standard Deviation: An Absolute Measure of Risk
2-4d. Normal Probability Distribution
2-4e. Coefficient of Variation: A Relative Measure of Risk
2-5. Risk and Required Return
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercise
Part II. Demand and Forecasting
Chapter 3. Demand Analysis
3-1. Demand Relationships
3-1a. The Demand Schedule Defined
3-1b. Constrained Utility Maximization and Consumer Behavior
3-2. The Price Elasticity of Demand
3-2a. Price Elasticity Defined
3-2b. Interpreting the Price Elasticity: The Relationship between the Price Elasticity and Sales Revenue
3-2c. The Importance of Elasticity-Revenue Relationships
3-2d. Factors Affecting the Price Elasticity of Demand
3-3. The Income Elasticity of Demand
3-3a. Income Elasticity Defined
3-4. Cross Elasticity of Demand
3-4a. Cross Price Elasticity Defined
3-4b. Interpreting the Cross Price Elasticity
3-4c. Antitrust and Cross Price Elasticities
3-4d. An Empirical Illustration of Price, Income, and Cross Elasticities
3-5. The Combined Effect of Demand Elasticities
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Chapter 4. Estimating Demand
4-1. Statistical Estimation of the Demand Function
4-1a. Specification of the Model
4-2. A Simple Linear Regression Model
4-2a. Assumptions Underlying the Simple Linear Regression Model
4-2b. Estimating the Population Regression Coefficients
Using the Regression Equation to Make Predictions
4.3a. Inferences about the Population Regression Coefficients
4-3b. Correlation Coefficient
4.3c. The Analysis of Variance
Multiple Linear Regression Model
Use of Computer Programs
Estimating the Population Regression Coefficients
Using the Regression Model to Make Forecasts
Inferences about the Population Regression Coefficients
The Analysis of Variance
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Appendix 4A. Problems in Applying the Linear Regression Model
Chapter 5. Business and Economic Forecasting
5-1. The Significance of Forecasting
5-2. Selecting a Forecasting Technique
5-2a. Hierarchy of Forecasts
5-2b. Criteria Used to Select a Forecasting Technique
5-2c. Evaluating the Accuracy of Forecasting Models
5-3. Alternative Forecasting Techniques
5-4. Deterministic Trend Analysis
5-4a. Components of a Time Series
5-4b. Some Elementary Time-Series Models
5-4c. Secular Trends
5-4d. Seasonal Variations
5-5. Smoothing Techniques
5-5a. Moving Averages
5-5b. First-Order Exponential Smoothing
5-6. Barometric Indicators
5-6a. Leading, Lagging, and Coincident Indicators
5-7. Survey and Opinion-Polling Techniques
5-7a. Forecasting Macroeconomic Activity
5-7b. Sales Forecasting
5-8. Macroeconometric Models
5-8a. Advantages of Econometric Forecasting Techniques
5-8b. Single-Equation Models
5-8c. Multi-Equation Models
5-8d. Consensus Forecasts: Livingston and Blue Chip Forecaster Surveys
5-9. Forecasting with Input-Output Tables
5-10. Advanced Material: Stochastic Time-Series Analysis
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Chapter 6. Managing in the Global Economy
6-1. Introduction
6-2. Import-Export Sales and Exchange Rates
6-2a. Foreign Exchange Risk
6-3. Outsourcing
6-4. China Trade Blossoms
6-4a. China Today
6-5. The Market for U.S. Dollars as Foreign Exchange
6-5a. Import-Export Flows and Transaction Demand for a Currency
6-5b. The Equilibrium Price of the U.S. Dollar
6-5c. Speculative Demand, Government Transfers, and Coordinated Intervention
6-5d. Short-Term Exchange Rate Fluctuations
6-6. Determinants of Long-Run Trends in Exchange Rates
6-6a. The Role of Real Growth Rates
6-6b. The Role of Real Interest Rates
6-6c. The Role of Expected Inflation
6-7. Purchasing Power Parity
6-7a. PPP Offers a Better Yardstick of Comparative Size of Business Activity
6-7b. Relative Purchasing Power Parity
6-7c. Qualifications of PPP
6-7d. The Appropriate Use of PPP: An Overview
6-7e. Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate Index
6-8. International Trade: A Managerial Perspective
6-8a. Shares of World Trade and Regional Trading Blocs
6-8b. Comparative Advantage and Free Trade
6-8c. Import Controls and Protective Tariffs
6-8d. The Case for Strategic Trade Policy
6-8e. Increasing Returns
6-8f. Network Externalities
6-9. Free Trade Areas: The European Union and NAFTA
6-9a. Optimal Currency Areas
6-9b. Intraregional Trade
6-9c. Mobility of Labor
6-9d. Correlated Macroeconomic Shocks
6-10. Largest U.S. Trading Partners: The Role of Nafta
6-10a. A Comparison of the EU and NAFTA
6-10b. Gray Markets, Knockoffs, and Parallel Importing
6-11. Perspectives on the U.S. Trade Deficit
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Appendix 6A. Foreign Exchange Risk Management
Part III. Production and Cost
Chapter 7. Production Economics
7-1. The Production Function
7-1a. Fixed and Variable Inputs
7-2. Production Functions with One Variable Input
7-2a. Marginal and Average Product Functions
7-2b. The Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns
7-2c. Increasing Returns with Network Effects
7-2d. Producing Information Services under Increasing Returns
7-2e. The Relationship between Total, Marginal, and Average Product
7-3. Determining the Optimal Use of the Variable Input
7-3a. Marginal Revenue Product
7-3b. Marginal Factor Cost
7-3c. Optimal Input Level
7-4. Production with Multiple Variable Inputs
7-4a. Production (Output Constant) Isoquants
7-4b. The Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution
7-5. Determining the Optimal Combination of Inputs
7-5a. Isocost Lines
7-5b. Minimizing Cost Subject to an Output Constraint
7-6. A Fixed Proportions Optimal Production Process
7-6a. Production Processes and Process Rays
7-7. Measuring the Efficiency of a Production Process
7-8. Returns to Scale
7-8a. Measuring Returns to Scale
7-8b. Increasing and Decreasing Returns to Scale
7-8c. The Cobb-Douglas Production Function
7-8d. Empirical Studies of the Cobb-Douglas Production Function in Manufacturing
7-8e. A Cross-Sectional Analysis of U.S. Manufacturing Industries
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercise
Appendix 7A. Production Economics of Renewable and Exhaustible Natural Resources, Advanced Material
Chapter 8. Cost Analysis
8-1. The Meaning and Measurement of Cost
8-1a. Accounting versus Economic Costs
8-1b. Three Contrasts between Accounting and Economic Costs
8-2. Short-Run Cost and Product Functions
8-2a. Average and Marginal Cost Functions
8-3. Long-Run Cost Functions
8-3a. Optimal Capacity Utilization: Three Concepts
8-4. Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
Product-Level Internal Economies of Scale
8-4a. The Percentage of Learning
8-4b. Diseconomies of Scale
8-4c. The Overall Effects of Scale Economies and Diseconomies
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercise
Chapter 9. Applications of Cost Theory
9-1. Estimating Cost Functions
9-1a. Issues in Cost Definition and Measurement
9-1b. Controlling for Other Variables
9-1c. The Form of the Empirical Cost-Output Relationship
9-1d. Statistical Estimation of Short-Run Cost Functions
9-1e. Statistical Estimation of Long-Run Cost Functions
9-1f. Determining the Optimal Scale of an Operation
9-1g. Economies of Scale versus Economies of Scope
9-1h. Engineering Cost Techniques
9-1i. The Survivor Technique
9-1j. A Cautionary Tale
9-2. Break-Even Analysis
9-2a. Graphical Method
9-2b. Algebraic Method
9-2c. Some Limitations of Break-Even Analysis
9-2d. Doing a Break-Even versus a Contribution Analysis
9-2e. A Limitation of Contribution Analysis
9-2f. Operating Leverage
9-2g. Inherent Business Risk
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Part IV. Pricing and Output Decisions: Strategy and Tactics
Chapter 10. Prices, Output, and Strategy: Pure and Monopolistic Competition
10-1. Introduction
10-2. Competitive Strategy
10-2a. Generic Types of Strategies
10-2b. Product Differentiation Strategy
10-2c. Cost-Based Strategy
10-2d. Information Technology Strategy
10-2e. The Relevant Market Concept
10-3. Porter’s Five Forces Strategic Framework
10-3a. The Threat of Substitutes
10-3b. The Threat of Entry
10-3c. The Power of Buyers and Suppliers
10-3d. The Intensity of Rivalrous Tactics
10-3e. The Myth of Market Share
10-4. A Continuum of Market Structures
10-4a. Pure Competition
10-4b. Monopoly
10-4c. Monopolistic Competition
10-4d. Oligopoly
10-5. Price-Output Determination under Pure Competition
10-5a. Short Run
10-5b. Profit Maximization under Pure Competition (Short Run): Adobe Corporation
10-5c. Long Run
10-6. Price-Output Determination under Monopolistic Competition
10-6a. Short Run
10-6b. Long Run
10-7. Selling and Promotional Expenses
10-7a. Determining the Optimal Level of Selling and Promotional Outlays
10-7b. Optimal Advertising Intensity
10-7c. The Net Value of Advertising
10-8. Competitive Markets under Asymmetric Information
10-8a. Incomplete versus Asymmetric Information
10-8b. Search Goods versus Experience Goods
10-8c. Adverse Selection and the Notorious Firm
10-8d. Insuring and Lending under Asymmetric Information: Another Lemons Market
10-9. Solutions to the Adverse Selection Problem: Advanced Material
10-9a. Mutual Reliance: Hostage Mechanisms Support Asymmetric Information Exchange
10-9b. Brand-Name Reputations as Hostages
10-9c. Price Premiums with Non-Redeployable Assets
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Chapter 11. Price and Output Determination: Monopoly and Dominant Firms
11-1. Monopoly Defined
11-2. Sources of Market Power for a Monopolist
11-2a. Increasing Returns from Network Effects
11-3. Price and Output Determination for a Monopolist
11-3a. Spreadsheet Approach: Profit versus Revenue Maximization for Polo Golf Shirts
11-3b. Graphical Approach
11-3c. Algebraic Approach
11-3d. The Importance of the Price Elasticity of Demand
11-4. The Optimal Markup, Contribution Margin, and Contribution Margin Percentage
11-4a. Gross Profit Margins
11-4b. Components of the Margin
11-4c. Monopolists and Capacity Investments
11-4d. Limit Pricing
11-4e. Using Limit Pricing to Hamper the Sales of Generic Drugs
11-5. Regulated Monopolies
11-5a. Electric Power Companies
11-5b. Natural Gas Companies
11-6. The Economic Rationale for Regulation
11-6a. Natural Monopoly Argument
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Chapter 12. Price and Output Determination: Oligopoly
12-1. Oligopolistic Market Structures
12-1a. Oligopoly in the United States: Relative Market Shares
12-2. Interdependencies in Oligopolistic Industries
12-2a. The Cournot Model
12-3. Cartels and Other Forms of Collusion
12-3a. Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Successful Collusion
12-3b. Cartel Profit Maximization and the Allocation of Restricted Output
12-3c. Cartel Analysis: Algebraic Approach
12-4. Price Leadership
12-4a. Barometric Price Leadership
12-4b. Dominant Firm Price Leadership
12-5. The Kinked Demand Curve Model
12-6. Avoiding Price Wars
Growing the Market
Summary
Exercises
Chapter 13. Best-Practice Tactics: Game Theory
13-1. Oligopolistic Rivalry and Game Theory
13-1a. A Conceptual Framework for Game Theory Analysis
13-1b. Components of a Game
13-1c. Cooperative and Noncooperative Games
13-1d. Other Types of Games
13-2. Analyzing Simultaneous Games
13-2a. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
13-2b. Dominant Strategy Defined
13-3. Nash Equilibrium Strategy Defined
13-3a. Mixed Nash Equilibrium Strategy
13-4. The Escape from Prisoner’s Dilemma
13-4a. Multiperiod Punishment and Reward Schemes in Repeated Play Games
13-4b. Unraveling and the Chain Store Paradox
13-4c. Mutual Forbearance and Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
13-4d. Winning Strategies in Evolutionary Computer Tournaments: Tit for Tat
13-4e. Bayesian Reputation Effects
13-4f. Price-Matching Guarantees
13-5. Analyzing Sequential Games
13-5a. Industry Standards as Coordination Devices
13-5b. Importance of the Order of Play
13-5c. A Sequential Coordination Game
13-5d. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Sequential Games
13-6. Business Rivalry as a Self-Enforcing Sequential Game
13-6a. First-Mover and Fast-Second Advantages
13-7. Credible Threats and Commitments
13-8. Mechanisms for Establishing Credibility
13-8a. Replacement Guarantees
13-8b. Hostages Support the Credibility of Commitments
13-8c. Credible Commitments of Durable Goods Monopolists
13-8d. Planned Obsolescence
13-8e. Post-Purchase Discounting Risk
13-8f. Lease Prices Reflect Anticipated Risks
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Appendix 13A. Entry Deterrence and Accommodation Games
Chapter 14. Pricing Techniques and Analysis
14-1. A Conceptual Framework for Proactive, Systematic-Analytical, Value-Based Pricing
14-2. Optimal Differential Price Levels
14-2a. Graphical Approach
14-2b. Algebraic Approach
14-2c. Multiple-Product Pricing Decision
14-2d. Differential Pricing and the Price Elasticity of Demand
14-3. Differential Pricing in Target Market Segments
14-3a. Direct Segmentation with “Fences”
14-3b. Optimal Two-Part Tariffs
14-3c. Couponing
14-3d. Bundling
14-3e. Price Discrimination
14-4. Pricing in Practice
14-4a. Product Life Cycle Framework
14-4b. Full-Cost Pricing versus Incremental Contribution Analysis
14-4c. Pricing on the Internet
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Appendix 14A. The Practice of Revenue Management
Part V. Organizational Architecture and Regulation
Chapter 15. Contracting, Governance, and Organizational Form
15-1. Introduction
15-2. The Role of Contracting in Cooperative Games
15-2a. Vertical Requirements Contracts
15-2b. The Function of Commercial Contracts
15-2c. Incomplete Information, Incomplete Contracting, and Post-Contractual Opportunism
15-3. Corporate Governance and the Problem of Moral Hazard
15-3a. The Need for Governance Mechanisms
15-4. The Principal-Agent Model
15-4a. The Efficiency of Alternative Hiring Arrangements
15-4b. Creative Ingenuity and the Moral Hazard Problem in Managerial Contracting
15-4c. Formalizing the Principal-Agent Problem
15-4d. Screening and Sorting Managerial Talent with Optimal Incentives Contracts
15-5. Choosing the Efficient Organizational Form
15-6. Prospect Theory Motivates Full-Line Forcing
15-7. Vertical Integration
15-7a. The Dissolution of Assets in a Partnership
Summary
Exercises
Case Exercises
Appendix 15A. Auction Design and Information Economics
Chapter 16. Government Regulation
16-1. The Regulation of Market Structure and Conduct
16-1a. Market Performance
16-1b. Market Conduct
16-1c. Contestable Markets
16-2. Antitrust Statutes and Their Regulatory Enforcement
16-2a. The Sherman Act (1890)
16-2b. The Clayton Act (1914)
16-2c. The Robinson-Patman Act (1936)
16-2d. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act (1976)
16-3. Antitrust Prohibition of Selected Business Decisions
16-3a. Collusion: Price Fixing
16-3b. Mergers That Substantially Lessen Competition
16-3c. Merger Guidelines (2010)
16-3d. Monopolization
16-3e. Wholesale Price Discrimination
16-3f. Refusals to Deal
16-3g. Resale Price Maintenance Agreements
16-4. Command and Control Regulatory Constraints: An Economic Analysis
16-4a. The Deregulation Movement
16-5. Regulation of Externalities
16-5a. Coasian Bargaining for Reciprocal Externalities
16-5b. Qualifications of the Coase Theorem
16-5c. Impediments to Bargaining
16-5d. Resolution of Externalities by Regulatory Directive
16-5e. Resolution of Externalities by Taxes and Subsidies
16-5f. Resolution of Externalities by Sale of Pollution Rights: Cap and Trade
16-6. Governmental Protection of Business
16-6a. Licensing and Permitting
16-6b. Patents
16-7. The Optimal Deployment Decision: To License or Not
16-7a. Pros and Cons of Patent Protection and Licensure of Trade Secrets
16-7b. Conclusion on Licensing
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Tags: James R Mcguigan, R Charles Moyer, Frederick HdeB Harris, Managerial Economics, Strategies, Tactics


