Justice Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls 1st Edition by Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles, John Weymark ISBN 0521640938 9780521640930

1. Introduction

• Themes from Rawls

  • Harsanyi on Rawls

  • Liberal Egalitarian Approaches to Personal Responsibility

  • Arneson on Personal Responsibility

  • Griffin on Moral Intuition

• Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems

  • Ordinal and Cardinal Utility

  • Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems

  • The Sen–Weymark Critique

  • Roemer on the Sen–Weymark Critique

  • Social Welfare Functionals and Welfarism

  • Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark on Social Aggregation under Uncertainty

  • D’Aspremont and Mongin on Welfarism and Social Aggregation

  • Hild, Jeffrey, and Risse on Ex Ante versus Ex Post Social Aggregation

• Goodness and Well-Being

  • Broome on the Coherence of Preference-Based Utilitarianism

  • Sugden on a Common Currency of Advantage

  • Fleurbaey and Maniquet on Fair Social Orderings

  • Barry on Want Satisfaction

• Sharing the Gains from Social Cooperation

  • Naturalistic versus Normative Theories

  • Game Theory

  • Binmore on Natural Justice

  • Skyrms on the Evolutionary Viability of Fairness Norms

  • McClennen on the Use of Cooperative Dispositions as a Coordinating Device

• Rights and Liberties

  • Pettit on Republicanism

  • Riley on Rule Utilitarianism and Liberal Priorities

• Concluding Remarks

• References

Part One: Themes from Rawls

• 2. Rawls’s Theory of Justice

  • What Choices People Would Make in Ignorance of Their Own Personal Interests

  • The Maximin Principle

  • Other Absolute-Priority Principles in Rawls’s Theory

  • Rawls’s Attempt to Deny Moral Credit to Many People Performing Valuable Services to Society

  • Some Comments on Rawls’s Argument

  • Rawls’s Conception of Justice and Social Policy

  • Free Will and Moral Responsibility

  • Another Interpretation of Free Will: The Bearer’s Responsibility View

  • References

• 3. Rawls and Responsibility

  • Rawls on Deservingness and Responsibility

  • The Canonical Moment Version of Rawlsian Justice

  • Responsibility for Voluntary Choices is Problematic

  • Responsibility for Ends Reconsidered

  • Joint Responsibility on the Part of Individual and Society for Individual Ends

  • Effectively Equivalent Options

  • Are We Responsible At Most for What Lies Within Our Control?

  • The Hybrid Proposal

  • Bert’s Case

  • Two Rawlsian Rejoinders

• 4. Improving Our Ethical Beliefs

  • Piecemeal Appeal to Intuition

  • Purist Views

  • Have We Been Too Hard on Intuitions?

  • The Coherence Theory

  • A Coherence Theory for Ethics

  • What We Need

Part Two: Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems

• 5. Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Is Not a Utilitarian

  • Introduction

  • Harsanyi’s Argument

  • Why the IO Is Not a Utilitarian

  • The Analogy With Individual Choice

  • Conclusion

  • References

• 6. Social Aggregation and the Expected Utility Hypothesis

  • Introduction

  • State-Contingent Alternatives and Social Evaluation Functionals

  • Interpersonal Utility Comparisons and Information Partitions

  • Expected Utility Theory for State-Contingent Alternatives

  • Welfarism

  • Single-Profile Aggregation

  • Multiprofile Aggregation

  • Single-Information-Set Aggregation

  • Single-Preference-Profile Aggregation

  • Concluding Remarks

  • References

• 7. A Welfarist Version of Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem

  • Introduction

  • A SWFL Version of the Aggregation Theorem for a Single Profile of VNM Preferences

  • A Welfarist Version of the Aggregation Theorem

  • Concluding Remarks: More on SWFLs and Cardinality

  • References

• 8. Preference Aggregation after Harsanyi

  • Introduction

  • Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism

  • Aggregation Ex Ante

  • Aggregation Ex Post

  • References

Part Three: Goodness and Well-Being

• 9. Can There Be a Preference-Based Utilitarianism?

  • Introduction

  • Uncertainty

  • Additivity

  • Preferencism as an Account of Individual Good

  • Ideal Preferencism

  • A Quantitative Concept of Good

  • The Expectational Concept

  • Interpersonal Comparability

  • Evolutionary Equilibrium

  • Conclusion

  • References

• 10. A Common Currency of Advantage

  • The Common Currency of Pleasure

  • Harsanyi, Imaginative Empathy, and Rational Preference

  • Rawls and Primary Goods

  • Money Metrics

  • An Impersonal Money-Metric of Opportunity

  • Conclusion

  • References

• 11. Utilitarianism versus Fairness in Welfare Economics

  • Introduction

  • Justifying Social Orderings

    • Ordinalism versus Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

    • Social Rankings versus Allocation Rules

  • Constructing Social Orderings

    • Direct Inquiry

    • Rationalizing Allocation Rules

  • Concluding Comments

  • References

• 12. Rationality and Want-Satisfaction

  • Introduction

  • Rawls’s Objection

  • Elster’s Objection

  • Conclusion

Part Four: Sharing the Gains from Social Cooperation

• 13. Naturalizing Harsanyi and Rawls

  • Introduction

  • Teleological Utilitarianism

  • Nonteleological Moral Theories

    • Harsanyi’s Nonteleological Utilitarianism

    • Rawls’ Model

    • Kantian Foundations for Interpersonal Comparison

  • The Original Position as a Natural Norm

    • Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run

    • Morality as a Short-Run Phenomenon

  • Reform

  • References

• 14. The Social Contract Naturalized

  • Introduction

  • Distributive Justice, Symmetry

  • Evolution of Justice I

  • Distributive Justice, Asymmetry

  • Evolution of Justice II

  • Conclusion

  • Postscript July 2006

  • References

• 15. An Alternative Model of Rational Cooperation

  • Introduction

  • Mutual Gains and Losses

  • Modeling Cooperative Interaction

  • What Drives the Equilibrium Analysis?

  • Rethinking Rational Cooperation

  • Mixed Games

  • Repeated Interaction over Time

  • Bargaining Theory

  • A More Realistic Setting

  • An Alternative Model of Cooperation

  • The Case for the Revised Model of Cooperation

  • Rule-Governed Choice

  • The Efficiency-Egalitarian Principle

  • The Problem of Ideology

  • The Question of Adaptive Efficiency

  • A Final Observation

  • References

Part Five: Rights and Liberties

• 16. Republican Political Theory

  • The Republican Ideal of Freedom

    • The Constant Connection

    • Interference and Arbitrary Interference

    • The Harder-to-Lose-Freedom Effect

    • The Easier-to-Lose-Freedom Effect

    • Three Further Remarks

    • References

  • The Significance of the Republican Ideal

    • The Paley Connection

    • Redistribution and Freedom as Noninterference

    • Redistribution and Freedom as Nondomination

    • References