Futile Diplomacy Volume 4 Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab Israeli Conflict 1954 1956 1st Edition by Neil Caplan ISBN 1138905259 9781138905252

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ISBN 10: 1138905259 
ISBN 13: 9781138905252
Author: Neil Caplan

Futile Diplomacy Volume 4 Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab Israeli Conflict 1954 1956 1st Table of contents:

Part One The Background of Anglo–American Co-operation, 1948-54
Chapter I Anglo–American Support for Bilateral and United Nations Peace Efforts
Dynamics of Anglo–American Co-operation
Mutual perceptions
Support for Bilateral Negotiations
Support for United Nations Initiatives
Chapter II The Two-Pronged Approach
‘A Gradual Process of Education’ of the Arabs to Accept Israel
Foreign Office instructions, 1951
New State Department instructions, 1952
‘Asking the impossible’
Pressure on Israel for Gestures and Concessions
Chapter III Nibbling at the Edges: The Failure of Conflict Management
The Tripartite Declaration
Diplomatic Representations in Support of UNTSO
Anglo-American Proposals for Reducing Frontier Tensions
Critique from the field
Jordanian and Israeli responses
Starting a Chain of Confidence-Building Measures
From the ‘Edges’ Back to the Core Issues
Chapter IV Attempts at Conflict Resolution
Calls for a ‘Positive Policy’ – a Settlement by Compulsion?
The case for non-involvement
Forestalling Israeli pre-emptive action
Waiting for the right moment
American and British Plans for a Comprehensive Settlement
American initiatives
Backing for Bernadotte, 1948
The ‘eight points’, 1949
‘Conditions of Arab/Israel Settlement’,1952
‘Possible Terms of Settlement’, 1953
Convergence of British and American Thinking
Part Two The Best Laid Plans
Chapter V Preparing Alpha
British Good Offices Offered
Looking for an Arab Opening; Keeping the Israelis Reassured
From Co-Operation to Collaboration: Formulation of Anglo-American Terms of Settlement
Alpha launched: American consultations
British preparations: Shuckburgh’s tour of the Middle East
Shuckburgh’s report
Washington Meetings, January-February 1955
Other preparations
Chapter VI First Approaches
Eden and Nasir: First Hints of Alpha
Setbacks: Baghdad Pact and Gaza Raid
Impact on launching Alpha
Gaza frontier tensions: UN attempts at conflict management
Byroade, Fawzi and Nasir: Early Probings
London and Paris Meetings: Fine-Tuning the Negev Proposals
Factoring in Israel: Security Treaty Versus Arab–Israeli Settlement
Israeli reactions
Part Three Stumbling from Obstacle to Obstacle
Chapter VII From Secret Soundings to Public Pronouncements: The Dulles Statement, August 1955
The Waiting Game, April – August 1955
Dulles’ Decision to Go Public
The Dulles Statement
Timing and preparation of the statement
In the Soviet shadow
Bad omens on the eve
The Dulles statement, 26 August 1955
Aftermath
Early reactions
Naming the starting price: Israeli and Egyptian manoeuvring
Back to the drawing-board: London consultations, September 1955
Chapter VIII Arms and Alpha: The Arab Connection
Western Arms and Aid for the Arabs
Soviet Arms for Egypt: The End of the Tripartite Monopoly
Sharett’s Hat-in-Hand Diplomacy: Paris and Geneva
Fears of an Israeli Pre-Emptive Strike
New Moves to Court Nasir
Chapter IX Eden’s Guildhall Speech, November 1955
Guildhall Speech: Seeking a Compromise between 1947 and the Status Quo
Arab Reactions
The Israeli Reaction
Mahmud Fawzi: Principles behind the Egyptian Position
Chapter X Showdown with Sharett
Build-up to a Confrontation betweem the us and Israel
Dulles’ ‘Bombshell Surprise’,8 21 November 1955
Not Another Munich: Israel Sets out Its Position
A New Israeli ‘Peace Offensive’?
Finessing Us-Israeli Differences
Between Optimism and Pessimism
Chapter XI Arms and Alpha: The Israeli Connection
Hesitations Regarding Israel’s Arms Requests
Lake Kinneret Raid
Arms as Carrots for Negotiations
Arms and the Anderson Mission
A Brief Assessment67
Chapter XII Alpha’s Last Chance: The Anderson Mission
Preparing for American Mediation
Anderson’s Mission: Mandate and Expectations
First Meetings in Cairo
First Meetings in Israel
Return to Cairo
Return to Jerusalem
Interlude: Washington, Cairo, Jerusalem
Conclusions
Chapter XIII Alpha and Gamma: Post-Scripts and Post-Mortems
‘Last Shot’ at a Meeting between Nasir and Ben-Gurion
Anderson’s Final Visit
From ‘Alpha’ to ‘Omega’
The Principal Players: Nasir and Israel
Chapter XIV Carrots and Sticks: The Limits of Anglo—American Coercive Diplomacy
Militant Protagonists and International Opinion
The Context: British and American Interests
Carrots and Sticks: An Inventory
1. Diplomatic representations
2. Diplomatic support or condemnation
3. Offer or withhold financial aid
4. Offer, delay or withhold military aid
5. Offering good offices to the parties
6. Conciliation
7. Mediation
Anglo-American Co-operation
American and British Presumptions
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
‘Arms and the Dam’69
Documents
Document 1: Tripartite Declaration, 25 May 1950
Document 2: Tentative Conditions for an Arab—Israel Settlement, 29 July 1952
1. General
Territorial Provisions
Ethnographic Provisions
Miscellaneous
Document 3: Possible Terms of Settlement, 2 December 1953
Document 4: C.A.E. Shuckburgh, the Elements of a Settlement, 15 December 1954
Document 5: Points of Agreement in [Anglo-American] London Discussions of Arab-Israel Settlement, 10 March 1955
I. General
II. Method and Timing of the Approach to the Parties
III. Inducements and Psychological Factors
IV. Elements of a Settlement
A. Territorial Adjustments
B. Refugees
C. Jerusalem
D. Communications arrangements
E. The Boycott
V. The Form of a Settlement and Guarantees to the Parties
B. Instruments of Settlement
C. Security Guarantees
VI. The Roles of France, Turkey, and the United Nations
VII. Cost of the Operation
Document 6: Proposals by Secretary of State Dulles for a Settlement in the Arab-Israel Zone, 26 August 1955
The Arab-Israeli Problem
Proposed Loan to Israel
Collective Security Measures
Problem of Boundaries
Document 7: Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick Minute: The Middle East, 30 October 1955
Egypt
Document 8: Anthony Eden’s Guildhall (Mansion House) Speech, 9 November 1955
British Aims
Frontier Problems
Offer of Services
Document 9: Draft of Proposed Agreed Position Between US and UK on Middle East Policy, 9 November 1955
The Middle East
The Premises
Future Policy
Document 10: Aide-Mémoire from the Israeli Embassy, Washington, to the Department of State, 6 December 1955
Document 11: Statement of General Principles which would Provide a Satisfactory Basis for the Resolu

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