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Assertion On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech 1st Edition by Sanford C Goldberg ISBN 0198732481 9780198732488

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Author(s): Sanford C. Goldberg
ISBN(s): 9780198732488, 0198732481
Edition: Hardcover
File Details: PDF, 15.19 MB
Year: 2015
Language: english
SKU: EB-10519754 Categories: , Tag:

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ISBN 10: 0198732481 
ISBN 13: 9780198732488
Author: Sanford C Goldberg

Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He defends the view that this type of speech act is answerable to a constitutive norm–the norm of assertion. The hypothesis that assertion is answerable to a robustly epistemic norm is uniquely suited to explain assertion’s philosophical significance–its connections to other philosophically interesting topics. These include topics in epistemology (testimony and testimonial knowledge; epistemic authority; disagreement), the philosophy of mind (belief; the theory of mental content), the philosophy of language (norms of language; the method of interpretation; the theory of linguistic content), ethics (the ethics of belief; what we owe to each other as information-seeking creatures), and other matters which transcend any subcategory (anonymity; trust; the division of epistemic labor; Moorean paradoxicality). Goldberg aims to bring out these connections without assuming anything about the precise content of assertion’s norm, beyond regarding it as robustly epistemic. In the last section of the book, however, he proposes that we do best to see the norm’s epistemic standard as set in a context-sensitive fashion. After motivating this proposal by appeal to Grice’s Cooperative Principle and spelling it out in terms of what is mutually believed in the speech context, Goldberg concludes by noting how this sort of context-sensitivity can be made to square with assertion’s philosophical significance.

Assertion On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech 1st Table of contents:

Part I. Introduction
1. What Is Assertion? In Defense of the Norm-Based Account
1.1 The Nature of My Project
1.2 Assertoric Practice: Examples
1.3 The Explananda: Features of Assertoric Speech
1.4 Theories of Assertion: Four Approaches
1.5 Applying the Approaches to the Explananda
1.6 The Constitutive Rule Account: Objections and Replies
1.7 Conclusion
Part II. The Epistemic Significance of Assertion
2. Assertion and the Spread of Knowledge
2.1 Assertion’s Role in the Spread of Knowledge
2.2 Two Framing Assumptions
2.3 Varieties of Evidentialism Regarding Assertion’s Role in the Spread of Knowledge
2.4 Strong Evidentialism and the Positive Reasons Requirement
2.5 Against the Positive Reasons Requirement
2.6 On the Very Possibility of Non-Evidential Accounts
2.7 Non-Evidential Accounts: Interpersonal Views (Trust and Assurance)
2.8 Non-Evidential Accounts: The Norm of Assertion
2.9 Conclusion
3. Assertion and Testimony
3.1 Overview
3.2 Assertion-Generated Expectations: Entitlements and Responsibilities
3.3 Assertion’s Norm and the Buck-Passing and Blame Phenomena
3.4 Assertion and the Act of Testifying
3.5 The Norm of Assertion as Common Knowledge
3.6 The Norm-Based Account vs. the Assurance View
3.7 Are Testimony-Constituting Assertions Evidence?
3.8 Conclusion
Part III. Other Applications: Mind, Language, and More
4. Assertion and the Method of Interpretation (Radical and Otherwise)
4.1 The Mutually Manifest, Robustly Epistemic Norm of Assertion: MMENA
4.2 Davidson’s Characterization of the Task of Interpretation
4.3 From Davidsonian Radical Interpretation to the Norm of Assertion
4.4 MMENA and the Epistemology and Methodology of Interpretation
4.5 In Defense of the Norm-Based Account of Interpretation: AIP
4.6 Interpretation, Comprehension, and the Epistemology of Testimony
4.7 Conclusion
5. Assertion and Assertoric Content
5.1 A Role for MMENA in the Determination of Assertoric Content
5.2 MMENA and the Hypothesis of Face-Value Interpretations
5.3 The Idea of Face-Value Interpretations as a Useful Fiction
5.4 Against Idiosyncrasy
5.5 Against Internalism about Assertoric Content
5.6 Conclusion
6. Assertion and Belief
6.1 The Link between Assertion and Belief: Contingent or Essential?
6.2 MMENA and the Assertion–Belief Connection
6.3 Does Warranted Assertion Require Belief?
6.4 Belief-Worthiness, Assertion, and the Pragmatics of Epistemic Self-Representation
6.5 Assertion and Moore’s Paradox
6.6 The Norm of Assertion and the Norm of Belief
6.7 In Defense of Different Standards for Assertion and Belief
6.8 Conclusion
7. The Ethics of Assertion (and Belief)
7.1 MMENA and the Ethics of Assertion and Belief
7.2 The Ethics of Assertion, Part I: What the Speaker Owes to the Hearer
7.3 The Ethics of Assertion, Part II: What the Hearer Owes to the Speaker
7.4 The Obligation to Assert: “You Should Have Told Me So!”
7.5 Deriving (some) Ethics of Belief from the Obligation to Assert
7.6 Conclusion
8. Anonymous Assertion
8.1 Paradigmatically, Assertion Is a Public Act
8.2 Anonymity
8.3 The Gap: Reductionism and Non-Reductionism Revisited
8.4 Minding the Gap: Assessing Assertions
8.5 Anonymity and the Impoverished Mechanisms for Policing and Assessing Assertoric Responsibility
8.6 Effects of Anonymity: Mutually Diminished Expectations
8.7 Relativized Anonymity and Anonymity-Policing Regimes
8.8 Conclusion
Part IV. A Case for Context-Sensitivity in the Norm of Assertion
9. Assertion and Disagreement
9.1 The Problem: The Persistence of Assertions under Conditions of Systematic Disagreement
9.2 Preliminaries
9.3 Systematic Peer Disagreements as Evidence of Unreliability
9.4 Systematic Peer Disagreements and Grounds for Self-Doubt
9.5 Systematic Peer Disagreements and Epistemic Defeat
9.6 Philosophical Disputes as Systematic Peer Disagreements
9.7 The Persistence of Assertions in Systematic Peer Disagreements
9.8 Conclusion
10. Mutuality and Assertion
10.1 The Challenge of Disagreement: Some Desiderata Regarding an Answer
10.2 Cooperativity, Mutual Belief, and the Fixation of Standards of Assertoric Warrant
10.3 Epistemic Groups and Assertoric Practice
10.4 Objections and Replies: What Is Reasonably Regarded as Mutually Believed
10.5 Conclusion
11. The Costs of Context-Sensitivity
11.1 Implications of Context-Sensitivity in the Standard for Warranted Assertion
11.2 The Significance of Speech Context
11.3 The Epistemic Significance of Assertion, Reconsidered
11.4 Sincerity in Assertion, Reconsidered
11.5 Assertion and Moore’s Paradox, Revisited
11.6 Children’s Assertion

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