Handbook of Security and Networks 1st Edition by Yang Xiao, Frank H Li, Hui Chen – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 9814273031, 9789814273039
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ISBN 10: 9814273031
ISBN 13: 9789814273039
Author: Yang Xiao, Frank H Li, Hui Chen
Handbook of Security and Networks 1st Table of contents:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Part I: Overview of Network Security
Chapter 1 SECURITY IN WIRELESS DATA NETWORKS
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Security and Wireless Overview
1.2.1. Introduction to Security
1.2.2. Introduction to the Wireless Networking
1.2.3. Security Attacks
1.3. Security in WLAN 802.11
1.3.1. IEEE 802.11 Standard
1.3.2. WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)
1.3.3. WEP Weaknesses
1.3.4. IEEE 802.1x: EAP over LAN (EAPOL)
1.3.5. IEEE 802.11i Standard
1.3.6. RSN
1.3.7. WAP
1.4. Security in Bluetooth Networks
1.5. Security in WMAN IEEE 802.16
1.5.1. The 802.16 Protocol Layers
1.5.2. WMAN Security Concerns
1.6. Thoughts on Wireless Security
1.6.1. Best Practices
1.6.2. Security Policy
1.6.3. Is the Security Problem Solved?
1.7. Recent Proposals
1.7.1. PANA
1.7.2. LWAPP
1.7.3. DRKH
1.8. Summary
References
Chapter 2 ENABLING INFORMATION CONFIDENTIALITY IN PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE OVERLAY NETWORKS
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Problem Definition
2.2.1. Pub/Sub Confidentiality
2.2.2. Threat Model
2.3. Information Foiling
2.3.1. Information Foiling Mechanism
2.3.2. Performance Metrics
2.3.3. Communication Overhead
2.3.4. Discussions
2.4. Fake Message Generation in Content-based Pub/Sub
2.4.1. A Simple Probabilistic Model
2.4.2. Fake Message Generation Schemes
2.5. Evaluation
2.5.1. Experimental Setup
2.5.2. Results: Indistinguishability
2.6. Asymmetric Communications: Generalization of Information Foiling
2.6.1. Asymmetric Communications
2.6.2. Asymmetric Communication Confidentiality
2.6.3. Application of Information Foiling
2.7. Related Work
2.8. Conclusions
References
Chapter 3 SECURITY ENHANCEMENT OF NETWORK PROTOCOL RFCs
3.1. Introduction
3.1.1. Security Robustness
3.1.2. Blame the Protocol Design?
3.1.3. Blame the Implementation?
3.1.4. Blame the RFC?
3.1.5. Better RFCs
3.2. Inadequacies in Protocol RFCs
3.2.1. Missing Specification Qualities
3.2.2. Poor Definition of Valid Packets
3.2.3. Weak Handling of Security Issues
3.2.4. Prone to Denials of Service
3.2.5. Prone to Unauthorized Use
3.3. Specifications v. Designs v. Implementations
3.3.1. Explicit Description of Design Freedoms
3.3.2. Formal Methods Brief
3.3.3. Specification Language ÖM
3.4. Protocol Engine
3.4.1. States and State Vectors
3.4.2. Time Stamps and Time Outs
3.4.3. Histories and Logs
3.4.4. Servers
3.4.5. Clients
3.5. Security Enhanced RFCs
3.5.1. RFC Terms
3.5.2. Validity of Packet Structure
3.5.3. Actions for Illegal Packets
3.5.4. Denial of Service
3.5.5. Unauthorized Use
3.5.6. Implementation Issues
3.6. Discussion
3.6.1. Formal Methods
3.6.2. Code Analysis and Generation
3.6.3. Specifiers’/Implementers’ Problem?
3.7. Conclusion
3.7.1. Advice to RFC Writers
3.7.2. Advice to RFC Approval Bodies
3.7.3. Advice to Implementers
3.7.4. Future Work
3.7.5. Conclusions
References
Chapter 4 AUTHENTICATION OF SCALABLE MULTIMEDIA STREAMS
4.1. Introduction
4.2. Background
4.2.1. Requirements for Multimedia Authentication Solutions
4.2.2. Background and Common Techniques
4.3. Authentication of Data Streams and Nonscalable Video Streams
4.3.1. Authentication of Data Streams
4.3.2. Non-scalable Media Stream Authentication
4.4. Scalable Media Authentication
4.4.1. Approaches Based on Hash Chaining
4.4.2. Approaches Based on Hash Trees
4.5. Comparison
4.6. Conclusion and Research Directions
References
Chapter 5 EXPLAINING SYSTEM SECURITY ISSUES TO COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS
5.1. Introduction
5.2. Attack Techniques
5.2.1. Reconnaissance
5.2.2. Deception
5.2.3. Denial of Service
5.3. Kernel Architecture
5.3.1. Loadable Kernel Modules
5.3.2. Network Filter Modules
5.3.3. Fine-Grained Privileges
5.4. Boot Exploits
5.4.1. BIOS
5.4.2. OS Boot Loaders
5.4.3. OS Kernel Initialization
5.5. Init Process Exploits
5.5.1. Expectations of an Init
5.5.2. A Tour of Past Exploits
5.5.3. Trojaned inits
5.5.4. Checking the Integrity of init
5.6. Buffer Overflow Exploits
5.6.1. The Buffer Overflow Error
5.6.2. Stack Smashing
5.6.3. Techniques of Avoiding Buffer Overflow
5.7. Network Exploits
5.7.1. IPv4 Exploits
5.7.2. UDP Exploits
5.7.3. TCP Exploits
5.7.4. DNS Exploits
5.7.5. ICMP Exploits
5.7.6. ARP Poisoning
5.7.7. Covert Channels
5.7.8. Traffic Scrubbing
5.8. Secure Installation
5.8.1. Terminology
5.8.2. Proper Configuration
5.8.3. Fortification
5.9. Secure Distributions of Linux
5.9.1. Definition of a Distribution
5.9.2. What Makes a Distribution Secure?
5.10. Kernel Hardening
5.10.1. Kernel Exploits
5.10.2. Kernel Patches
5.10.3. Synthesis of a New Kernel
5.11. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
Part II: Attacks on Networks
Chapter 6 ATTACKER TRACEBACK IN MOBILE MULTI-HOP NETWORKS
6.1. Introduction
6.2. Related Work
6.3. Design Requirements
6.4. Risk Analysis
6.4.1. Mobile Multi-hop Network Domains
6.4.2. Mobile Attack Identification
6.4.3. Impact of Legitimate Mobility on Traceback
6.5. Traffic Monitoring-based Traceback
6.5.1. DoS Attacker Traceback
6.5.2. DDoS Attacker Traceback
6.5.3. Performance Analysis
6.6. Mobile Attacker Traceback
6.6.1. Information Gathering
6.6.2. Information Fusion
6.6.3. Examples for Mobile Attacker Traceback
6.6.4. Performance Analysis for Mobile Attacker Traceback
References
Chapter 7 DETECTING DOS ATTACKS AND SERVICE VIOLATIONS IN QOS-ENABLED NETWORKS
7.1. Introduction
7.2. Denial of Service Attacks
7.2.1. Types of Denial of Service Attacks
7.2.2. Detection and Reaction Approaches
7.2.3. Prevention and Suppression Approaches
7.3. Monitoring to Detect Service Violations and DoS Attacks
7.3.1. Core-based Monitoring
7.3.2. Edge-based Monitoring
7.3.3. Violation and DoS Detection
7.4. Quantitative Comparison
7.4.1. Setup
7.4.2. Overhead Calculation
7.4.3. Results and Analysis
7.4.4. Summary
7.5. Conclusions
References
Part III: Key and Key management
Chapter 8 KEY ESTABLISHMENT — SECRECY, AUTHENTICATION AND ANONYMITY
8.1. Introduction
8.2. Two-Factor AKE Using Smart Cards and Passwords
8.2.1. Security Requirements and Adversarial Capabilities
8.2.2. Offline Dictionary Attack
8.2.3. A Secure Two-Factor Smart-Card-Based Password AKE
8.3. Authenticated Key Establishment in Roaming Networks
8.3.1. Deposit-case Attack Against Secure Roaming
8.3.2. A Secure AKE Protocol for Roaming Networks
8.4. Enhancing User Privacy in AKE Protocols
8.4.1. User Privacy Against Eavesdroppers
8.4.2. User Privacy Against both Eavesdroppers and Foreign Networks
8.5. Remarks
References
Chapter 9 DETECTING MISUSED KEYS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
9.1. Introduction
9.1.1. Motivation
9.1.2. Contributions
9.1.3. Organization
9.2. System Models and Design Goals
9.3. The Detection of Misused Keys
9.3.1. Scheme I: The Naive Approach
9.3.2. Scheme II: Cumulative Commitment
9.3.3. Scheme III: Distributed Detection
9.4. Implementation Issues
9.5. Related Work
9.6. Conclusion and Future Work
References
Chapter 10 A SURVEY OF KEY REVOCATION SCHEMES IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS
10.1. Introduction
10.2. Motivation
10.3. Key Revocation Schemes in MANETs
10.3.1. System Models of General-Purpose MANETs
10.3.2. Key Revocation Schemes Based on Threshold Cryptography
10.3.3. Self-Organized Key Revocation Schemes
10.3.4. Other Key Revocation Schemes
10.4. Key Revocation Schemes in VANETs
10.4.1. System Models of VANETs
10.4.2. Certificate Revocation Based on Weighted Voting
10.4.3. Certificate Revocation Based on Suicide Attack
10.4.4. RSU-Aided Certificate Revocation
10.5. Conclusions
References
Part IV: Malware
Chapter 11 HARDWARE CONTROLLED SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DETECT AND PREVENT VIRUS
11.1. Introduction
11.2. Active Detection and Prevention Approach
11.2.1. Signature-Based Anti-Virus Technique
11.2.2. Hardware Controlled Scanner Anti-Virus Method
11.3. Systematic Anti-Virus Solution
11.3.1. Structure of Active Detection and Prevention Systematic Approach
11.3.2. Implementation Issues
11.4. Experiments
11.5. Related Work
11.6. Conclusion and Future Work
11.6.1. Conclusion
11.6.2. Future Work
References
Chapter 12 A MATHEMATICAL VIEW OF SELF-REPLICATING MALWARE
12.1. Introduction
12.1.1. Methods of Self Replication
12.1.2. Historical Examples
12.2. Related Literature
12.3. Homogeneous Epidemic Models
12.3.1. The Simple Homogeneous Epidemic
12.3.2. The General Homogeneous Epidemic
12.4. Community of Households Model
12.4.1. Symmetric Case of COH Model
12.5. Epidemic Slowed by Bandwidth Limits
12.5.1. Special Symmetric Case of COH-LIHB Model
12.6. Active Defenses
12.6.1. Dynamic Quarantine
12.6.2. Rate Limiting
12.7. Conclusions
References
Chapter 13 WORM PROPAGATION AND INTERACTION IN MOBILE NETWORKS
13.1. Introduction
13.2. Background
13.3. Worm Interaction Model and Metrics
13.3.1. Predator-Prey Relationships
13.3.2. Basic SIR Model
13.3.3. Worm Interaction Model
13.3.4. Metrics
13.3.5. Worm Interaction Model Analysis
13.3.6. Node Characteristics
13.4. Simulation Results
13.4.1. Uniform Encounters
13.4.2. Non-uniform Encounters
13.5. Summary and Future Works
Acknowledgements
References
Chapter 14 WINDOWS ROOTKITS A GAME OF “HIDE AND SEEK”
14.1. Introduction
14.2. Rootkit Evolution
14.3. Anatomy of the Rootkit Compromise
14.3.1. I/O Manager
14.3.2. Device & File System Drivers
14.3.3. Object Manager
14.3.4. Security Reference Monitor
14.3.5. Process & Thread Manager
14.3.6. Configuration Manager
14.3.7. Memory Manager
14.4. Technical Survey of Basic Windows Rootkit Techniques
14.4.1. Hooking
14.4.2. Filter Drivers
14.4.3. Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)
14.5. Survey of Advanced Windows Rootkit Techniques
14.5.1. Virtual Memory Subversion
14.5.2. VMM Rootkits
14.5.3. System Management Mode (SMM) Rootkits
14.5.4. BIOS and PCI Rootkits
14.5.5. The Big Picture: Rootkit Attack Patterns
14.6. Rootkit Detection
14.6.1. Software Solutions
14.6.2. Hardware Solutions
14.7. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
Chapter 15 AN OVERVIEW OF BOT ARMY TECHNOLOGY AND PROSPECTS
15.1. Introduction
15.2. Background
15.2.1. Botnet and Botnet Operation
15.2.2. Malware
15.3. Bot Capability Evolution and Bot Defense
15.3.1. Bot Army Capabilities
15.3.2. Bot Army Technology Development
15.3.3. Defending Against Bot Armies
15.4. Summary
References
Part V: Latest Security-Related Topics on Computer Networking
Chapter 16 PERFORMANCE OF BRIDGING ALGORITHMS IN IEEE 802.15.3 MULTI-PICONET NETWORKS
16.1. Introduction
16.2. Operation of 802.15.3 Networks
16.3. Interconnecting IEEE 802.15.3 Piconets
16.4. Implementing Multi-Piconet Networks with 802.15.3
16.5. Related Work
16.6. Fixed vs. Adaptive CTA Allocation
16.7. Adaptive CTA with Threshold Hysteresis
16.8. Conclusion
References
Chapter 17 AUTHENTICATION AND BILLING FOR WLAN/CELLULAR NETWORK INTERWORKING
17.1. Introduction
17.2. WLAN/cellular Integrated Service Model Architecture
17.2.1. Authentication and Registration
17.2.2. PID Renewal
17.2.3. Event-tracking
17.2.4. Service Session Setup
17.3. Messaging Scheme
17.3.1. Anonymity of User Identity
17.3.2. Proposed Authentication Process
17.3.3. Variation of the Proposed Authentication Scheme
17.4. Supplementary Operations
17.4.1. PID Renewal Process
17.4.2. Event-tracking for Billing Support
17.5. Performance Evaluation
17.5.1. Security Analysis
17.5.2. Overhead Analysis
17.5.3. Characteristics Comparison of Billing Support
17.6. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
References
Chapter 18 CONSTRUCTION OF FAULT-TOLERANT VIRTUAL BACKBONES IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
18.1. Introduction
18.2. Notations and Definitions
18.3. Probabilistic Schemes
18.4. Deterministic Schemes
18.4.1. Centralized Algorithms
18.4.2. Distributed Algorithms
18.5. Conclusion Remarks
References
Chapter 19 SERVICE IOT FOR DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (DRM)
19.1. Introduction
19.1.1. OMA DRM
19.1.2. NTP-DRMT
19.1.3. Test Procedure for the DRM Registration
19.2. TTCN-3 Based Test System
19.2.1. DRM Test Management and Control (TMC)
19.2.2. DRM TTCN-3 Executable (TE)
19.2.3. DRM SUT Adapter (SA)
19.3. TTCN-3 Interfaces for DRM
19.3.1. The TTCN-3 Control Interface (TCI) for DRM
19.3.2. The TTCN-3 Runtime Interface (TRI) for DRM
19.4. A DRM Conformance Test Scenario
19.5. Conclusions
19.6. Acknowledgement
References
Appendix A: The Conformance and Interoperability Test Cases
Chapter 20 PATIENT PRIVACY IN HEALTHCARE WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
20.1. Introduction
20.2. Clinical Information System: Architectural and Security Issues
20.3. ECC and Hardware Platform for Healthcare WSNs
20.4. Key Generation for the Patient Group
20.4.1. Mutual Authentication and Key Generation using CTSS
20.4.2. Scaled Multi-Party SSL Protocol with Ephemeral ECC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
20.4.3. Maintenance of the Session Key
20.4.4. Distribution of the Session Key
20.5. Analysis of Energy Consumption
20.6. Conclusion
References
Chapter 21 SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION IN REAL WIRELESS SENSORS: A REVIEW
21.1. Introduction
21.2. TinySec: A Link Layer Security Design
21.2.1. Reasons of the Need of Link Layer Security
21.2.2. TinySec Packet Format
21.2.3. Using TinySec in TinyOS Applications
21.2.4. Different Modes of Operation in TinySec
21.2.5. Advantages of TinySec
21.3. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
21.3.1. Introduction
21.3.2. Motivation for using Elliptic Curve Cryptography
21.3.3. Math for RSA vs. ECC
21.3.4. Asymmetric Cryptography as a Fine Balance
21.3.5. Authentication with Asymmetric Cryptography
21.3.6. How are Elliptic Curves Used?
21.3.7. The Diffie Hellman/DSA Cryptosystems and the Discrete Logarithm Problem
21.3.8. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
21.3.9. Elliptic Curve Groups
21.3.10. Advantages of ECC
21.4. LEAP: Localized Encryption & Authentication Protocol
21.4.1. Individual Key
21.4.2. Group Key
21.4.3. Cluster Key
21.4.4. Pair wise Shared Key
21.4.5. Multi-hop Pair wise Shared Keys
21.4.6. Group Keys
21.4.7. Advantages of LEAP
21.5. SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks
21.6. MPA: Multi Path Authentication
21.6.1. Types of Message Passing
21.6.2. Distribution of Keys
21.6.3. Message Passing
21.6.4. Key Setup
21.6.5. Compromising Situation
21.6.6. Assess Metric
21.6.7. Advantages of MPA
21.6.8. Disadvantages of MPA
21.7. LHAP: Light-weight Hop-by-hop Authentication Protocol
21.7.1. Traffic Authentication
21.7.2. Trust Development
21.7.3. Advantages of LHAP
21.7.4. Disadvantages of LHAP
21.8. Comparisons
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